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Discrete time case.
In what follows as basic model we shall consider the game in extensive form with
perfect information.
Definition 2. A game tree is a finite oriented treelike graph K with the root x0.
We shall use the following notations. Let x be some vertex (position). We denote
by K(x) a subtree K with the root in x . We denote by Z(x) immediate successors
of x . The vertices y , directly following after x , are called alternatives in x (y ∈
Z(x)). The player who makes a decision in x (who selects the next alternative
position in x), will be denoted by i(x). The choice of player i(x) in position x
will be denoted by x¯ ∈ Z(x).
Let N = {1, . . . , n} — be the set of all players in the game.
Definition 3. A game in extensive form with perfect information (see Kuhn
(1953)) G(x0) is a graph tree K(x0), with the following additional properties:
The set of vertices (positions) is split up into n + 1 subsets
P1,P2, . . . ,Pn+1, which form a partition of the set of all vertices of the
graph tree K . The vertices (positions) x ∈ Pi are called players i personal
positions, i = 1, . . . , n; vertices (positions) x ∈ Pn+1 are called terminal
positions.
In each final vertex (position) the system of real numbers
h(w) = (h1(w), . . . , hn(w)), w ∈ Pn+1, hi (w) > 0, i = 1, . . . , n is defined.
Where hi (w) is the payoff of player i in the final vertex (position).
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Definition 4. A strategy of player i is a mapping Ui (·), which associate to each
position x ∈ Pi a unique alternative y ∈ Z(x).
As in the previous case denote by Hi (x ; u1(·), . . . , un(·)) the payoff function od
player i ∈ N in the subgame G(x) starting from the position x .
Hi (x ; u1(·), . . . , un(·)) = hi (x ′l )
where x ′l ∈ Pn+1 is the last vertex (position) in the path x = (x ′1, x ′2, . . . , x ′l )
realized in the subgame G(x), when the n-tuple of strategies (u1(·), . . . , un(·))
is played.
Denote by u¯(·) = (u¯1(·), . . . , u¯n(·)) the n-tuple of strategies and the trajectory
(path) x¯ = (x¯0, x¯1, . . . , x¯m), x¯m ∈ Pn+1 such that
max
u1(·),...,un(·)
n∑
i=1
Hi (x0; u1(·), . . . , un(·)) =
=
n∑
i=1
Hi (x0; u¯1(·), . . . , u¯n(·)) =
n∑
i=1
hi (x¯m). (15)
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The path x¯ = (x¯0, . . . , x¯m) satisfying Eq. (15) we shall call "optimal cooperative
trajectory".
Define in G(x0) characteristic function in a classical way
V (x0;N) =
n∑
i=1
hi (x¯m),
V (x0; ∅) = 0,
V (x0;S) = Val ΓS,N\S(x0),
where Val ΓS,N\S(x0) is a value of zero-sum game played between coalition S
acting as first player and coalition N \ S acting as player 2, with payoff of player
S equal to ∑
i∈S
Hi (x0; u1(·), . . . , un(·)).
Define L(x0) as imputation set in the game G(x0).
L(x0) =
{
α = (α1, . . . , αn) : αi > V (x0; {i}),
∑
i∈N
αi = V (x0;N)
}
.
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Regularized game Gα(x0). For every α ∈ L(x0) define the noncooperative game
Gα(x0), which differs from the game G(x0) only by payoffs defined along optimal
cooperative path x¯ = (x¯0, . . . , x¯m). Let α ∈ L(x0). Define the imputation dis-
tribution procedure (IDP) as function βk = (β1(k), . . . , βn(k)), k = 0, 1, . . . ,m
such that
αi =
m∑
k=0
βi (k). (16)
Define by Hαi (x0; u1(·), . . . , un(·)) the payoff function in the game Gα(x0) and by
x¯ = {x¯0, . . . , x¯m} the cooperative path
Hαi (x0; u1(·), . . . , un(·)) = Hi (x0; u1(·), . . . , un(·))
for all u1(·), . . . , un(·) such that the path x = {x0, . . . , xm} differs from x¯ =
{x¯0, . . . , x¯m}, and
Hαi (x0; u¯1(·), . . . , u¯n(·)) = αi .
By the definition of the payoff function in the game Gα(x0) we get that the
payoffs along the optimal cooperative trajectory are equal to the components of
the imputation α = (α1, . . . , αn).
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Consider current subgames G(x¯k) along the optimal path x¯ and current imputa-
tion sets L(x¯k). Let αk ∈ L(x¯k).
Definition 5. The game Gα(x0) is called regularization of the game G(x0) (α-
regularization) if the IDP β is defined in such a way that
αki =
m∑
j=k
βi (j)
or βi (k) = αki − αk+1i , i ∈ N, k = 0, 1, . . . ,m − 1, βi (m) = αmi , α0i = αi .
Theorem 2. In the regularization of the game Gα(x0) there exist a Nash equilib-
rium with payoffs α = (α1, . . . , αn).
Proof. Along the cooperative path we have
αki > V (x¯k ; {i}), i ∈ N, k = 0, 1, . . . ,m.
since αk = (αk1 , . . . , αkn) ∈ L(x¯k) is an imputation in G(x¯k) (note that here
V (x¯k ; {i}) is computed in the subgame G(x¯k) but not Gα(x¯k)). In the same time
αki =
m∑
j=k
βi (j)
and we get
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m∑
j=k
βi (j) > V (x¯k ; {i}), i ∈ N, k = 0, 1, . . . ,m. (17)
But
∑m
j=k βi (j) is the payoff of player i in the subgame Gα(x¯k) along the coop-
erative path, and from (17) using the arguments similar to those in the proof of
Theorem 1 one can construct the Nash equilibrium with payoffs α = (α1, . . . , αn)
and resulting cooperative path x¯ = (x¯0, . . . , x¯m).
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Example. In this example as an imputation we shall consider Shapley value [Shap-
ley (1953)]. Using the proposed regularization of the game we shall see that there
exist a Nash equilibrium with payoffs equal to the components of the Shapley
value.
Fig. 1. Game G(x0)
In the game G(x0), N = {1, 2, 3}, P1 = {x1, x4, x7}, P2 = {x2, x5, x8}, P3 =
{x3, x6, x9}, P4 = {y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6, y7, y8, y9, y10}. h(y1) = (0, 5, 2), h(y2) =
(6, 1, 0), h(y3) = (1, 5, 0), h(y4) = (0, 2, 7), h(y5) = (0, 9, 0), h(y6) = (4, 1, 2),
h(y7) = (2, 3, 2), h(y8) = (0, 9, 0), h(y9) = (0, 3, 4), h(y10) = (1, 8, 1). The
cooperative path is x¯ = {x¯1, x¯2, x¯3, x¯4, x¯5, x¯6, x¯7, x¯8, x¯9, y¯10}.
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x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 y10
V (x ; {1}) 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 1
V (x ; {2}) 2 2 2 2 9 1 3 9 3 8
V (x ; {3}) 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 1
V (x ; {1, 2}) 7 7 6 9 9 5 9 9 3 9
V (x ; {2, 3}) 7 9 9 9 9 5 5 9 9 9
V (x ; {1, 3}) 6 6 6 7 0 6 4 0 4 2
V (x ; {1, 2, 3}) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Sh(x ; {1}) 17
6
13
6
12
6
16
6
2
6
22
6
24
6
2
6
2
6
1
Sh(x ; {2}) 26
6
28
6
27
6
28
6
56
6
16
6
30
6
56
6
26
6
8
Sh(x ; {3}) 17
6
19
6
21
6
16
6
2
6
22
6
6
6
2
6
32
6
1
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x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 y10
β1(j)
2
6
4
6
1
6
14
6
−28
6
−2
6
22
6
0 −4
6
1
β2(j) −1
6
−2
6
1
6
−28
6
40
6
−14
6
−28
6
30
6
−22
6
8
β3(j) −1
6
−2
6
−2
6
14
6
−20
6
16
6
4
6
−30
6
26
6
1
It can be easily seen that the inequality (17)
m∑
j=k
βi (j) > V (x¯k ; {i})
for i ∈ N holds in this case.
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Example.
(D,D,D,D) – NE, (A,A,A,A) – NOT NE
Characteristic Function of the game Γ1 (C.f. of Γ1)
v1(1, 2, 3, 4) = 12, v1(1, 2, 3) = 5, v1(1, 3, 4) = 5, v1(2, 3, 4) = 0, v1(1, 2, 4) = 5,
v1(1, 2) = 5, v1(1, 3) = 5, v1(1, 4) = 5, v1(2, 3) = 0, v1(2, 4) = 0, v1(3, 4) = 0,
v1(1) = 5, v1(2) = 0, v1(3) = 0, v1(4) = 0.
Sh1 =
(
27
4
, 7
4
, 7
4
, 7
4
)
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C.f. of Γ2
v2(1, 2, 3, 4) = 12, v2(1, 2, 3) = 5, v2(1, 3, 4) = 5, v2(2, 3, 4) = 9,
v2(1, 2) = 5, v2(1, 3) = 0, v2(1, 4) = 0, v2(2, 3) = 5, v2(2, 4) = 5, v2(3, 4) = 0,
v2(1) = 0, v2(2) = 5, v2(3) = 0, v2(4) = 0.
Sh2 =
(
19
12
, 65
12
, 30
12
, 30
12
)
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C.f. of Γ3
v3(1, 2, 3, 4) = 12, v3(1, 2, 3) = 5, v3(1, 3, 4) = 9, v3(2, 3, 4) = 9, v3(1, 2, 4) = 0
v3(1, 2) = 0, v3(1, 3) = 5, v3(1, 4) = 0, v3(2, 3) = 5, v3(2, 4) = 0, v3(3, 4) = 6,
v3(1) = 0, v3(2) = 0, v3(3) = 5, v3(4) = 0.
Sh3 =
(
1, 1, 90
12
, 30
12
)
Leon A. Petrosyan 4/37
C.f. of Γ4
v4(1, 2, 3, 4) = 12, v4(1, 2, 3) = 0, v4(1, 3, 4) = 9, v4(2, 3, 4) = 9, v4(1, 2, 4) = 9
v4(1, 2) = 0, v4(1, 3) = 0, v4(1, 4) = 5, v4(2, 3) = 0, v4(2, 4) = 5, v4(3, 4) = 5,
v4(1) = 0, v4(2) = 0, v4(3) = 0, v4(4) = 5.
Sh4 =
(
17
12
, 17
12
, 17
12
, 93
12
)
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C.f. of Γ5
v5(1, 2, 3, 4) = 12, v5(1, 2, 3) = v5(1, 3, 4) = v5(2, 3, 4) = v5(1, 2, 4) = 9
v5(1, 2) = v5(1, 3) = v5(1, 4) = v5(2, 3) = v5(2, 4) = v5(3, 4) = 6,
v5(1) = v5(2) = v5(3) = v5(4) = 3.
Sh5 = (3, 3, 3, 3)
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IDP (Imputation Distribution Procedure)
βk , k = 1, . . . , 5
Sh1 = β1 + Sh
2, Sh2 = β2 + Sh
3, . . . , Sh4 = β4 + Sh
5
β1 = (Sh
1−Sh2), β2 = (Sh2−Sh3), β3 = (Sh3−Sh4), β4 = (Sh4−Sh5), β5 = Sh5
∑5
k=1 βk = Sh
1,
∑5
k=2 βk = Sh
2,
∑5
k=3 βk = Sh
3,∑5
k=4 βk = Sh
4,
∑5
k=5 βk = Sh
5
β1 = (
62
12
,− 44
12
,− 9
12
,− 9
12
)
β2 = (
7
12
, 53
12
,− 60
12
, 0)
β3 = (− 512 ,− 512 , 7312 ,− 6312 )
β4 = (− 1912 ,− 1912 ,− 1912 , 5712 )
β5 = (3, 3, 3, 3)
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Associated Game Γ, and NE Strategically Supported Cooperation
(A,A,A,A) – NE
NE

62
12
+ 7
12
− 5
12
− 19
12
+ 3 > 5
53
12
− 5
12
− 19
12
+ 3 > 5
73
12
− 19
12
+ 3 > 5
57
12
+ 3 > 5
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